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Objects differ along many stimulus dimensions, but
observers typically group them into fewer ‘categories’
according to their potential use or behavioral relevance.
New experiments in awake, behaving monkeys open a
window onto the process of stimulus categorization
within the central nervous system.
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Our ability to categorize sensory stimuli allows us to
interact efficiently with arrays of objects that are
physically different, yet functionally similar. A pewter
beer stein only vaguely resembles a porcelain teacup, yet
they are equivalent in the sense that either can be used to
hold a beverage. A clay flowerpot, on the other hand, looks
a bit like both but serves an entirely different purpose.
The category to which an object belongs largely
determines how we interact with it; a complete physical
description of the object is often superfluous. Although it
feels effortless to us, categorizing sensory stimuli is a
notoriously difficult computational problem [1].
In early sensory areas of the cerebral cortex, stimulus
representation appears to depend almost exclusively on
elementary physical attributes, such as the orientation of
visual edges, the frequency of an auditory tone, or the
pressure of a somatosensory stimulus applied to the skin.
Neural responses in these areas are thus largely indepen-
dent of any perceptual category to which an object
belongs. In contrast, a small population of neurons in the
inferotemporal cortex — a higher order visual area in
primates — responds specifically when the face of another
monkey or human appears in the visual field [2]. ‘Face
cells’ appear to encode a specific category of visual
stimuli, irrespective of substantial variability in elemen-
tary physical attributes, such as the color, texture or shape
of the skin, hair or eyes. Stimulus categorization,
therefore, can be reflected in the responses of single
neurons when the stimulus category has substantial
behavioral significance to the animal.
Recently, Ranulfo Romo and his colleagues in Mexico
City have pursued combined behavioral and neurophysio-
logical experiments in rhesus monkeys which have pro-
vided insight into how somatosensory stimuli may be
categorized within the central nervous system [3–8]. In
these experiments, somatosensory stimuli acquired beha-
vioral significance through extensive training of the
monkeys on a simple categorization task. Somatosensory
stimuli, moving at various speeds, were applied to the
fingers of the left hand as illustrated in Figure 1. The
monkey was required to categorize each stimulus as ‘high
speed’ or ‘low speed’ in order to obtain a liquid reward.
Each trial began when the animal gripped a post with its
right hand; categorical judgments of stimulus speed were
indicated subsequently by reaching with the right hand to
one of two contact buttons. The monkeys developed their
categorical sense of high versus low speed through thou-
sands of trials of exposure to speeds that ranged from 12 to
30 millimeters per second, in 2 millimeter per second
increments. The monkeys were rewarded for categorizing
speeds of 20 millimeters per second or less as ‘low’ and
speeds of 22 millimeters per second or greater as ‘high’.
Using microelectrodes inserted across the dura mater, the
membranous sheath that covers the brain, Romo and 
Figure 1
The experimental set-up employed by Salinas and Romo [8]. The
monkey sat on a primate chair, facing a pair of response buttons.
Tactile stimuli were applied to the fingers of the left hand, which was
immobilized in the palm-up position by means of a half-cast. The
monkey placed his right hand on an immobile post to initiate each trial.
The probe moved along the fingers of the left hand from distal to
proximal at one of ten equally spaced speeds. Once the probe had
traveled 6.5 mm, the monkey had 1100 msec to release the key and
press a button indicating the speed category of the stimulus (the
medial button corresponded to low speeds and the lateral one
corresponded to high speeds). The fact that the stimulus excursion
was constant across all speeds forces stimulus duration to vary
systematically with speed. Thus the monkeys may have been attending
to the duration of the stimulus rather than to the speed, but this
distinction is not critical for analysis of categorization signals, which is
the main topic of the study. (Adapted from [7].)
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colleagues recorded the activity of single neurons in
several brain areas while the monkeys performed the cate-
gorization task. The recording technique is minimally
invasive, allowing multiple sessions to be conducted
without excessive tissue damage. Task-related activity
was observed in several areas of the brain, from the
primary somatosensory cortex to the primary motor cortex.
The central conceptual and technical challenge of these
experiments was to distinguish neural activity related to
the act of categorization from sensory activity related
simply to the representation of the stimulus, or motor
activity related specifically to the operant arm movement. 
The monkey’s sense of touch is obviously critical for
performing this task. Indeed, lesions of the primary
somatosensory cortex (S1), the first cortical area specialized
for processing tactile stimuli, severely impaired performance
on the categorization task [6]. Does speed categorization
occur in S1? Several lines of evidence suggest that this is not
the case [4]. Firstly, S1 neurons that are sensitive to stimu-
lus speed typically increase their responses linearly with the
speed of the tactile stimulus, irrespective of its category
(Figure 2, left). Thus, the primary variable speed, and not
speed category, is explicitly represented in the firing rates of
S1 neurons. Secondly, tactile stimulation induces identical
activity in S1 whether or not a trained monkey is actively
engaged in the task. Lastly, there is no discernible differ-
ence in the responses of S1 neurons to these stimuli in
trained and untrained monkeys; the trained monkeys’
knowledge of stimulus category is not manifest in S1.
More promising candidates for ‘categorical’ neural signals
were identified, however, in the premotor cortex [5],
putamen [3,7] and primary motor cortex (M1) [8]. In the
most elegant of these studies, Salinas and Romo [8] found
that roughly 15% of 477 neurons examined in M1 exhibited
category-specific responses. They restricted their search to
the region of the M1 motor map representing the right arm
(the arm making the operant reaching response). This
region of M1 contains neurons that discharge in conjunc-
tion with movements of the right arm, and it is therefore
the most likely region of M1 to contain categorical signals
related to performance on this task. In this region of M1,
Salinas and Romo [8] found that some category-specific
neurons responded optimally to high-speed stimuli,
whereas others responded best to low-speed stimuli.
Within each category, however, firing rates were remark-
ably constant, despite broad variation of stimulus speed
within the category. 
These properties are the hallmarks of category selectivity,
and can be visualized in the nearly step-shaped response
functions depicted in the lower right panel of Figure 2.
The stimulus-response functions measured in M1 contrast
strikingly with those measured in S1 (compare the lower
two panels of Figure 2), and the two groups of neurons
also differed in the timing of their activity during the trial
(also compare in Figure 2). S1 neurons responded best
during application of the stimulus to the skin, whereas M1
neurons responded best during the reaction time interval
after application of the stimulus but before execution of
the arm movement. 
From these data, Salinas and Romo [8] drew the
provocative conclusion that neural signals recorded in a
small population of M1 neurons represent the speed cate-
gory of the tactile stimulus. In this view, the categorical
neurons would provide a high-level signal that could guide
the selection of a specific operant arm movement, which is
then conveyed to motoneuron pools in the spinal cord.
The most serious difficulty for this conclusion is that the
categorical judgment made by the monkey correlates per-
fectly with the arm movement made to report the judg-
ment (left button for low speeds; right button for high
Dispatch R377
Figure 2
Typical results obtained by Romo and colleagues in the primary
somatosensory cortex (S1) and primary motor cortex (M1) of monkeys
trained on the task illustrated in Figure 1. At the top are shown twelve
examples of neural recordings (red), six from S1 (left) and six from M1
(right). All traces are aligned on stimulus (Stim) offset (all event times
are indicated by green lines). Each vertical red tick indicates an action
potential. S1 neurons discharge action potentials during tactile
stimulation at a rate proportional to stimulus speed. M1 neurons
respond later in the trial, at one of two rates corresponding to the
speed category. At the bottom, the rates of action-potential discharge
are plotted as a function of stimulus speed for typical S1 and M1
neurons. Some M1 neurons (right graph) are preferentially excited by
fast stimuli (red curve and example recordings above), while others
display the reverse tuning (cyan curve). In contrast, none of the S1
neurons (left graph) were preferentially excited by slow stimuli.
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speeds). Thus, it is possible that the apparent ‘categorical’
signals in M1 are no more than premotor signals for one of
the two operant arm movements, which might be expected
under standard notions of M1 physiology. 
Salinas and Romo [8] present two arguments against the
latter interpretation, both of which are strongly suggestive,
but neither of which is completely compelling. Firstly,
they performed control experiments on a number of iden-
tified ‘categorical’ neurons, in which the monkey pressed
the same two buttons in response to a simple visual
instruction, completely outside the context of the
somatosensory categorization task. About half of the ‘cate-
gorical’ neurons ceased to respond differentially to the two
arm movements in this control experiment, suggesting
that a simple motor explanation is not sufficient to explain
the differential activity observed during the categorization
task. This result strongly supports the argument that the
M1 neurons in question actually signal the perceptual
categorization, but the argument is not airtight as no quan-
titative measurements were made to confirm that various
parameters of the arm movements — latency, speed,
trajectory and accuracy — were identical in the two tasks.
Secondly, Salinas and Romo [8] argue that the known
physiology of M1 neurons could not possibly support the
large differences in category-related firing they observed
in their experiments. Georgopoulos et al. [9] have shown
that many reach-related neurons in M1 are tuned for the
direction of the reach: they respond optimally when the
monkey reaches in a particular direction, and their
responses fall off gradually as the direction of reaching
changes from the optimal. Salinas and Romo deliberately
positioned their two operant response buttons side by side,
separated by only 11 degrees of reach angle (see Figure 1).
From the tuning curves published by Georgopoulos and
others, an 11 degree difference in reach angle should result
in a very modest difference in firing rate for the two move-
ments. Thus a strictly motor explanation of the categorical
responses would appear unlikely. Again, this is a strong,
but not completely compelling, argument. Salinas and
Romo could make their case much stronger by actually
measuring the reach tuning curves of each neuron they
study, in order to demonstrate firmly that the categorical
signals are not accounted for by motor tuning curves.
The control measurements we have suggested are tedious
to perform and analyze, but they are critical if we are to
establish beyond doubt the existence of high-level signals
related to sensory categorization in M1. Salinas and Romo
are ideally positioned to gather even more compelling evi-
dence with experiments of this nature. Looking to the
future, Salinas and Romo could provide a coup de grâce by
training monkeys on a more complex version of the task,
in which the association between stimulus speed and
response movement are reversed on interleaved trials.
This could be accomplished by simply marking the ‘fast’
and ‘slow’ buttons uniquely (by color, for example) and
randomly swapping them between the two button loca-
tions. If the neurons maintain consistent category tuning
in both conditions, their activity would undeniably reflect
speed categorization. If, on the other hand, their category
preference reversed when the button locations reversed,
the activity would be more indicative of the monkey’s
intention to make a particular arm movement.
The division between sensory and motor functions in the
cortex is perhaps not as sharp as was once believed. Some
M1 neurons carry signals that are not easily classified as
sensory or motor, but appear to be intermediate between
the two. This complexity is not entirely unexpected. As
we push the envelope of neurophysiological recording into
the realm of processes linking sensation and action, the
line between them is blurring rapidly. Nevertheless, fasci-
nating questions are emerging, along with new opportuni-
ties for empirical investigation. For example, what exactly
is the processing path that links sensation to action? What
neural transformations are necessary to implement simple
cognitive operations such as categorization, discrimination
and motor planning? Must sensory signals be cast into an
abstract internal model of the world before a motor
response is planned, or might a more-or-less direct link
exist between sensory and motor representations within
the brain, at least for simple sensorimotor associations?
Answers to questions of this nature will certainly shape
how we think about neural information processing strate-
gies and the neural basis of cognition. The answers are
most likely to emerge from creative empirical studies like
those of Romo and colleagues, which exploit well-
designed behavioral paradigms in conjunction with the
tools of neurophysiology. 
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